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For  an  American  who  is  used  to  living  and  working  in  a 
large,  coast-to-coast  domestic  market,  where  there  is  thus  no 
internal  monetary  problem,  it  is  probably  difficult  to  fully 
understand the situation which the E.E.C.  has been experiencing 
since 1969.  In  fact,  although we  live in  a  large common  market 
of  260  million  consumers,  each  country  has  retained  its  own 
currency  and,  as  is  true  for  all  other  countries  in  the  world, 
since 1969 the exchange rates of the currencies of the Common 
Market have  become  unstable.  Our situation  can  therefore  be 
compared to a hypothetical one where the various states of the 
U.S.A.  - Texas,  California,  Kansas,  etc.  - had  their  own 
currencies  which  fluctuated  against  each  other.  We  in  the 
E.E.C.  are  obviously in  no  comfortable  position. 
It  should  be  recalled  that,  for  the  nine  member countries 
as a whole, international trade amounts to more than one quarter 
of the G.N.P.  and that more than  half of that is  intra-Community 
trade.  These  figures  are  an  average  for  the  whole  of  the 
Community  and  for  smaller  partners  like  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands, they amount to 55  %  and  75  %  respectively. But nonetheless it would be wrong to overestimate or under-
estimate  the  problems  with  which  we  have  to  live  as  a  result 
of this  situation. 
First  of  all,  I  should  like  to  explain  how  this  very  unusual 
situation  has  come  about. 
In  1958,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  founded  the  Common  Market 
and,  for nearly 20  years now,  this  Common  Market has  worked 
in  an  extremely  satisfactory  manner.  If we  assess  its  success 
in  terms  of the  growth of trade  relations  between  its  partners, 
which  is  only  normal,  then  we  have  no  reason  to  complain. 
Indeed,  between  1958  and  1973,  trade between  the  countries of 
the  E.E.C.  has  increased  sevenfold  in  volume.  Since  then, 
the growth has been  slower but nonetheless certain. 
However,  since  it  was  only  the  most  immediate  problem 
which was dealt with  in  1958,  namely the  building of a common 
market, no provisions were made with respect to either monetary 
or economic  union.  The  truth  is  that  what  has  been  achieved 
as  a  result of the Treaty of Rome  has,  in  fact,  never deserved 
the  name  « European  Economic  Union ».  However,  we  cannot 
regret  these  shortcomings,  because  if we  had  tried  to  accom-
plish everything in 1958,  we would have achieved nothing at all. 
As  long  as  the exchange  rates  between  the E.E.C.  partners 
remained stable,  this  institutional  weakness  did  not make  itself 
felt,  and  it  is  only  since  the  onslaught  of  galloping  inflation 
in  the  1970s  that we  have  been  encountering  difficulties  in  the 
Common  Market, where there is  no  monetary union. 
Like  other countries  which  are  the  victims  of  inflation,  we 
are affected by this scourge, in that it is the most unjust burden 
imaginable and  results in a loss of substance both  for business 
and for the Nation as  a whole. However, we are doubly affected 
by this scourge in that inflation in the  nine countries inevitably 
progresses  at  different  rates  and  can  therefore  be  termed 
differential inflation. 
I  would  almost be  inclined  to  say  that  differential  inflation 
is  even  worse than  just plain  inflation,  especially in  a Common 
Market which  is  only  20  years  old. 
We  have  nurtured  two successive  illusions  which  we  have 
been  forced to abandon  : 
The  first was  that,  in  the  Common  Market,  we  could  learn 
to  live  with  inflation.  Many  people  harboured  this  illusion 
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greater momentum, we were  gradually obliged to give  up such 
thinking. 
Our second  illusion  was  that  the  rates  of  inflation  in  the 
various countries of the E.E.C. would not deviate from each other 
to  any  excessive  degree.  This  illusion  has  also  had  to be  dis-
pelled,  and  here  I would  like to turn  to the  main subject of my 
speech, i.e. why the E.E.C.,  after so many years of a successful! 
Common Market, has been unable to accomplish monetary union. 
The  gap  between  the  various  rates  of inflation  has  admit-
tedly  narrowed  compared  to  the  peak  reached  in  the  period 
1974-76,  but  it  is  nonetheless  still  enormous.  For  example, 
between January 1977  and January 1978,  the rate of inflation in 
West  Germany was  3.2  Ofo,  whereas  the  corresponding  rate  in 
Italy was 14.1  Ofo,  which means a ratio between the two countries 
of more 1 :4, almost as  much  as  in  1975. 
The  most striking  aspect  is,  of course,  the  good  perform-
ance shown  by West  Germany since  the  start of inflation,  and 
this seems often hard to understand. I think that several factors 
have  played  a role in  this respect. 
Firstly,  Germany  is  the  only country  which,  in  the  course 
of  the  last  50  years,  has  twice  experienced  inflation  to  the 
finish. The first occasion was in  1923, when the Mark fell to one 
billionth  or less  of its  previous value,  and  the second  in  1948, 
when  the  Mark  stabilized  at  one  hundredth  of  its  value.  The 
inflation experienced  in  1923  was,  in  fact,  a  not inconsiderable 
factor in  the  rise  of Nazism.  Germany is  thus  the  only country 
where  a  general  incomes  policy  is  accepted  in  good  faith  by 
all  sections  of  the  population  and  where  it  is  considered 
unpatriotic to  act in  a manner which  might  boost  inflation.  To 
a certain  extent, the Netherlands  may also  be  mentioned  here. 
The  second factor would seem  to  be  that,  with  the  excep-
tion  of the  Saarland,  West  Germany  is  the  only E.E.C.  country 
where there  is  only one  trade  union. As  long  ago as  the  early 
1950s,  my  German  colleagues  in  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  put  forward  the  view  that  to  have  a  multitude  of 
trade  unions  meant  having  an  inflationary structure.  I  found  it 
very  difficult  to  assimilate  this  idea,  because  everywhere  in 
Europe  there  is  a  plurality  of trade  unions,  the  U.K.  holding 
the record with some 70  independent unions. Whatever we  may 
think, the Germans are convinced that the fight against inflation 
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as I know,  they have never forsaken this view.  Perhaps we have 
something to learn here, as West Germany is the country where 
inflation  has  been  contained  within  the  narrowest  limits. 
In  some  circles,  some  importance  is  also  attached  to  the 
existence of co-determination  by  personnel  in  the  management 
of large  enterprises  both  in  West  Germany  and  in  the  Nether-
lands. 
The  easiest  explanation  of all  for  this  development  is,  of 
course,  a  reference  to  the  overall  sense  of  discipline  of  the 
people  in  both  countries,  which  seems  a  somewhat  oversim-
plified explanation. 
This  brings  me  to  the  present  situation  and  the  chances 
we  have  of overcoming our differential  inflation, stabilizing  our 
exchange rates  and  attaining a de facto monetary union in  the 
E. E. C. 
Let me first of all recall a maxim used by Mr.  Giscard d'Es-
taing at the time when  he was still French  Minister of Finance : 
"There is only one rate of inflation which is compatible with 
a  monetary  union,  i.e.  a  zero  inflation  rate». What  he  clearly 
meant was  that,  as  long  as  the  European  countries suffer from 
a  veritable  inflationary « sociosis »,  this  inflation  will  inevitably 
be  differential  in degree. 
The  consequence  of this  differential  inflation  is  that,  since 
1974,  we  have  had  two  monetary  systems  in  the  E.E.C.  :  the 
so-called  «snake »  and  the  floating  currencies.  Germany,  the 
Benelux  countries  and  Denmark  are  E.E.C.  members  of  the 
« snake»,  while  the  currencies  of  France,  the  U.K.,  Ireland 
and  Italy  float.  Until  such  time  as  France  returns  to  the 
«snake»,  which  it  left  in  1976,  the  ''snake»  is  in  fact  a 
"DM area». 
Although  we  all  have  to  admit  that  the  floating  of  certain 
currencies was  unavoidable,  one must also concede that it has 
proved  disappointing.  Firstly,  the  float  has  been  accompanied 
in  most  cases  by  an  almost  constant  downward  trend,  and, 
secondly, this policy has not improved the employment situation. 
I sincerely hope that, following the  recent victory of the Centre 
Right  Coalition,  France  will  now  have  the  willpower  and  the 
capacity to  rejoin  the  " snake ». 
However,  we  should  not  conclude  from  this  that  we  may 
hope that,  one after the other,  the various partners will join the 
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government  be  capable  of  applying  strict  economic,  financial, 
social  and  monetary  discipline  and,  in  this  connection,  con-
ditions  are  likely  to  remain  difficult  for  many  years  to  come 
in  more than  one  partner of the E.E.C. 
Discipline in  all  these fields also means  a strong decision-
making  capacity  in  the  Community  as  well  as  in  the  member 
countries, and this is  hard to achieve. 
There seem  to be  two main  reasons  for our poor decision-
making  capacity  : 
Firstly, at a time when  Europe is raising the question of the 
transfer of sovereignty to the  European  Economic  Community, 
in  several  countries  the  problem  of a  certain  transfer  of sov-
ereignty to  regional  authorities  is  arising  in  an  acute  or latent 
form.  Particular  examples  in  this  respect  are  the  U.K.  and 
Belgium.  In  Italy,  the  devolution  of  central  power  to  provinces 
such  as  Sicily,  Sardinia,  etc.  has  never  worked  satisfactorily. 
Even  in  France,  a  certain  tension  arises  in  some  areas  such 
as  the  Basque  region,  Corsica  and  Brittany,  although  there 
seems  to  be  no  danger of any  real  unrest. 
Secondly,  present-day elections show an  unfortunate trend 
towards radicalization which in Europe means a tendency to vote 
for the extremes, although in all the different member countries, 
the  majority  of  people  really  belong  to  the  Centre.  This  has 
recently been  shown  in the French  elections and,  regardless  of 
appearances,  I  think  it  is  also  true  in  Italy.  In  most countries, 
the  government  has  a  narrow  majority,  insofar  as  it  has  a 
majority at all,  and  most governments  are  hardly in  a  position 
to make  long-term  decisions  or implement  stringent  economic 
measures. 
The development of Europe has been complicated further by 
a  number of very untimely circumstances  : 
First of all, the E.E.C.  is faced with unemployment of a large-
ly  structural  nature  affecting  some  7  million  people.  Much  of 
this  structural  unemployment  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  « baby 
boom »,  or  population  explosion,  of  the  early  1960s,  as  well 
as  to  the  increasing  number  of  women  going  to  work.  The 
European  Commission  has  just  calculated  that,  with  a  total 
population which will only increase by about 4.4  million people, 
the  working  population,  i.e.  the  number  of  people  seeking 
work, will increase by nearly 10 million, reaching a peak around 
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1985 onwards. At present, we are seeking a solution by extending 
the  system  of  part-time  working,  which  has  made  some 
progress,  despite  sometimes  fierce  opposition  on  the  part  of 
the  trade  unions. 
The  second  problem  confronting  a  number of European  coun-
tries  is  a  policy  on  the  part  of  the  trade  unions  to  seek  a 
general  reduction  in  working time,  under the Malthusian pretext 
of  obtaining  a  better  distribution  of  the  work  available,  but 
without accepting  a  corresponding  reduction  in  weekly wages. 
This problem  is  to  be  felt above all  in  Belgium,  where there  is 
quite  serious  tension  in  some  sectors,  which  we  nonetheless 
hope to overcome. 
Lastly,  there is the fall  in  the Dollar on  the exchange  mar-
kets.  For  the  E.E.C.  as  a  whole,  this  constitutes  a  problem  of 
exceptional  magnitude,  recalling  the  U.S.  devaluation  of  1934. 
This  drop  in  the  Dollar  has  dramatic  consequences  for  the 
European  economy.  What  disturbs  us  most  of all  is  that  this 
depreciation in  the U.S.  currency appears to be connected with 
the  rise  in  American  oil  imports,  the  U.S.  Government  being 
unable  as  yet  to  impose  a  plan  to  reduce  the  country's 
great dependence  on  such  imports. 
These  are  all  serious  problems  which  have  added  further 
complications  to  the  already  difficult  process  of  European 
integration. 
To  sum  up,  what  appears  to  be  the  most  probable 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  concerning  the  future  of  European 
unification  ? 
Firstly,  it would  be wrong to conclude from  the above  that 
the  European  ideal  has  lost  its  power  of  attraction  for  the 
European  public.  In  fact,  it  is  not  Europe  which  is  sick,  but 
the  European  States  which,  for the  greater  part,  have  almost 
lost their decision-making  capacity.  It  is  unlikely that we  shall 
be cured  by waving  a  magic wand. 
Secondly, the 1976  report by Belgium's Prime Minister that 
we were possibly heading for a two-speed  Europe may well fall 
somewhat short of reality. It is,  indeed, impossible for the E.E.C. 
to  refuse  entry to Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece,  despite  all  the 
economic  and,  in  particular,  agricultural  problems  which  their 
entry  will  cause,  especially  for  Italy  and  France.  These 
difficulties will  entail  a  series  of transitional  phases  necessary 
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countries  on  the  present  member  states. 
The most plausible theory is  that,  for many years,  we shall 
be  faced  with  a  three-speed  Europe.  But  saying  that,  I  must 
take care not to be misunderstood. I do not at all mean that the 
E.E.C.  is  in  danger of being  torn  into three parts.  What  I  mean 
is that in the framework of the Community the different political, 
social  and  economic  conditions  will  allow of  further  progress 
at  different  speeds,  interdependence  being  already  so  strong 
that  the  risk  of  disruption  is  nil.  What  de  Gaulle  dared  not 
attempt in 1965,  nobody will try in the future, the only exception 
being  the  French  Communists  who,  with  about  21  %  of  the 
French electorate, are, however, not in a position to threaten the 
cohesion  of the Community. 
To  elaborate on  this  three-speed  Europe,  Europe  Number 
One will obviously consist of those countries which are capable 
of sufficient self-discipline to  remain  in  the monetary "snake». 
Europe  Number  Two  will,  for  a  certain  period  of  time, 
undoubtedly  be  composed  of  those  of  the  nine  present 
members who will be unable to submit to a sufficiently stringent 
economic  and  social  policy  to  be  able  to  maintain  their 
exchange  rates  within  the  narrow  confines  of  the  monetary 
«snake». 
For ten years or more, Europe Number Three will doubtless 
be composed of the Mediterranean countries. This will certainly 
not  simplify  matters,  and  some  very  good  Europeans  would 
have  preferred  to  postpone  the  problem.  But  it amounts  to  a 
duty  towards  history  to  which  we  cannot  remain  indifferent  : 
Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece  belong  to  Europe. 
Finally, a few reflections on  recent events  : 
Firstly, the  French  elections have  been  a great relief to all 
Europeans  who  are  concerned  with  speeding  up  progress 
towards  European  unification.  What  is  particularly  comforting 
is the convergence towards the Centre which has emerged from 
the  French  elections.  It was,  in  fact,  the  French  Centre  which 
was  responsible  for  the  great  leap  forward  in  Europe  in 
the  1950s. 
There is now a  possibility of renewing  the  Franco-German 
joint action which has  been  the cornerstone of European  unifi-
cation since the end  of World War II. 
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Summit  held  in  Copenhagen  indicates that  European  elections 
will  indeed  be  held  in  June 1979.  For Europe,  this event  repre-
sents  a  unique opportunity to  make  progress  towards  stronger 
European  political  structures  and  European  parties,  with  a 
common  programme  transcending  the  borders  and  a  strong 
impact on  public  opinion. 
I  should  like  to  conclude  by  emphasizing  the  need  for  a 
general  line of European  action  based  on  the  absolute  priority 
for monetary union proposed by Mr. Roy Jenkins and harmonized 
economic  and  social  policy,  which  is  the  prerequisite  for 
monetary  stability.  In  the  meantime,  point  Number  One  is  the 
safeguarding  of  the  « snake»,  in  which  connection  I  would 
express  the  hope  that,  in  the  not  too  distant  future,  we  shall 
see the  re-entry of France in  the  joint float. 
After  the  dark  period  we  have  passed  through  since  the 
start of the  1970s,  it is  now possible,  and  even  probable,  that, 
despite  an  unbalanced  situation  on  the  employment  front,  we 
are  about  to  enjoy  a  more  favourable  trend  in  the  E.E.C. 
8 